AbSTRACT
Freedom of expression is a "cornerstone upon which the very existence of a democratic society rests" [citation omitted]. Its importance takes on a special meaning in the Western Hemisphere where numerous societies are building and developing democracies while coping with the legacy of authoritarianism, which exercised a profound institutional and cultural influence in the region. This article critically examines the Inter-American system of Human Rights, systematizing its jurisprudence while providing an analytical framework designed to fully realize this essential human right. Finally, this article proposes a series of measures to help achieve that important objective.
I. INTRodUCTIoN
Freedom of expression is a "cornerstone upon which the very existence of a democratic society rests."
1 Its importance takes on a special meaning in the Western Hemisphere, where numerous societies are building and developing democracies while coping with the legacy of authoritarianism, which had a deep institutional and cultural influence throughout the region. The approach taken by authorities towards freedom of expression serves as a social barometer of what direction change might take. Traditionally, serious economic, political, social, and security problems have been used to justify authoritarianism and validate the rejection of a pluralistic view of society for which freedom of expression is essential. In contrast to strongmen who govern without checks and balances, or the case of political or military vanguards who purport to "lead their nations or people," a human rights framework offers an alternative which postulates that the rule of law, including the right to free expression, represents both the values of human dignity and a path of action to confront societal problems.
In the human rights approach, freedom of expression is a necessary check to powerful executives and societal elites who monopolize information. It allows the free and pluralistic flow and dissemination of information essential to informed choices, facilitates individual participation in the democratic process, and strengthens civil society. In the Western Hemisphere, the adoption of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man in 1948 and the American Convention on Human Rights (Pact of San José, Costa Rica) in 1969 created a regional normative framework in the human rights arena, freely adopted by member states of the Organization of American States (OAS). Despite the human rights obligations and norms set forth in these documents, the region as a whole has yet to reach full compliance with the protection of the right to freedom of expression, including the adoption of a normative framework that guarantees a pluralistic society so that expression does not become an exclusive function of governmental power or private monopolies. 2 Often, the right of freedom of expression is either inadequately protected under domestic law or the rules designed to protect it are disregarded. 3 Measures that seriously infringe upon the right to freedom of expression include: prior censorship; contempt laws; 4 the seizing or barring of publications; excessive subsequent liability for libel and slander; absence of an effective normative framework that concerns monopolies of information and guarantees pluralism; and procedures that subject the free expression or dissemination of information to government control.
Through the exercise of prior censorship, bureaucracies decide what individuals can see, read, write, and produce by invoking such justifications as "national security," "public order," "protection of morals," "truth in information," and "personal honor." However, because the possibilities for abusing prior censorship are so great, enduring promotion of free debate is preferable to risking censorship's "protective" suffocation of the free expression of ideas. 6 Contempt or desacato laws penalize "offensive" expression directed at public officials or against private individuals concerning matters relevant to the society at large. Contempt laws are currently included in the criminal codes of the following seven Latin American countries: Bolivia, Brazil, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Venezuela. 7 Although punishing criticism was a logical corollary for authoritarian governments, it is incompatible with the development of a full democracy. Allowing criticism free from fear of punishment-especially when directed at authority or matters of public interest-reaffirms, inter alia, egalitarian principles and ensures that public officials carry out their duties with transparency and responsibility. 8 Conversely, the threat or imposition of penal sanctions suffocates democracy and responds to an authoritarian logic incompatible with the tenets of pluralistic society.
Subsequent and disproportionate liability in cases of libel and slander is often imposed under the guise of "defense of honor."
9 Such abuse severely curtails the right of free expression of ideas. 10 Monopolization of information by governments or private actors abusively defines and ignores the pluralism of democratic societies. However, the attacks against expression are not limited to a deficient regulatory framework. Unfortunately, many crimes committed against journalists, including assassination, go unpunished.
11
"Silencing" journalists threatens the population as a whole and is a stark 6 .
See Id. at 35-36. 10.
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reminder that anyone, including the most visible, can be eliminated if they dare to fully exercise their right to free expression.
12
Other de facto "measures" that seriously infringe upon freedom of expression include economic measures that punish or reward the press for its ideas, as well as tolerating public and private monopolies in information media. 13 These grave normative and factual shortcomings in the legal protection for freedom of expression still exist within many domestic legal systems, reaffirming the need for international and, in this case, regional protections of this fundamental freedom.
This article will analyze the rules and institutions that protect freedom of expression in the Western Hemisphere, namely those contained in the Inter-American system for the Protection of Human Rights (Inter-American system). It will briefly describe the Inter-American system, its organs, and the regulatory framework that applies to freedom of expression, while systematizing the relevant jurisprudence within that system. Finally, this article will conclude by proposing a series of measures necessary to achieve full enforcement of freedom of expression norms.
In the realm of free expression, crucial actors are not limited to members of the OAS or its regional political organs. The analysis shows a complex reality with initiatives adopted by domestic and transnational NGOs, the press, the judiciary, members of parliament, and individuals who, resorting to the regional system, use its procedures to demand implementation of international norms. Expression, like all rights, is not given or granted, but rather is the result of aspirations to a life worth living and hence a life worth fighting for. The regional system, through its framework for protection and possibilities for action has become a valuable tool at the international level for channeling those aspirations, but more needs to be done to ensure full protection of the right to freedom of expression. 14 
12.
See 1998 Report of the Special Rapporteur, supra note 8, at 26. 14.
The contributions of the Inter-American system have proceeded through different phases. The first phase was denouncing dictatorship, and mass and gross violations of human rights such as disappearances, torture, and the absence of political rights. The Inter-American system of protection of human rights itself then transitioned from a denunciation of dictatorships to a rejection of its legacy, which included attempts to cover the crimes of the past with a shroud of impunity. The defeat of dictatorship led to a process of democratic transitions and resulted in elected governments in all of the countries of the region, except Cuba.
II. THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM FoR THE PRoTECTIoN oF HUMAN RIGHTS
The international protection of human rights developed after World War II in response to the tragic failure of an international system that was based on the principle of absolute sovereignty, which excluded the acts of a government against its own citizens from the protections of human rights. 15 The grave consequences of this flawed approach (e.g., genocide, mass and gross violations of human rights) led to the development of international rules and institutions designed to identify and protect the rights of all individuals.
16

A. organs
The Inter-American system is a combination of human rights norms, institutions, and procedures created by the OAS member states, based upon the American Declaration 17 and the American Convention. 18 The organs responsible for supervising compliance with the established rules are the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 19 ("the Commission") and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 20 ("the Court"). The task of guaranRejection of impunity meant that no one-not even those who had administered fear and repression-could be above the law, and that everyone should answer for their crimes. In the interest of populations that had been prevented from speaking and receiving pluralistic information, the Inter-American system reinvigorated the value of the right to freedom of expression (e.g., defining the content of the right and creating the officer of the Special Rapporteur).
The third phase, where the system finds itself now, purports to contribute to the expansion of democracy, building on the human rights tradition to fully incorporate vulnerable groups (e.g., indigenous peoples, women, and the poor) into the enjoyment of rights. In this phase, freedom of expression continues to play a key role. Democracy requires free elections, but free elections are not enough. Democracy also requires separation of powers, an independent and impartial judiciary, and a congress to provide a sufficient check on executive power. It requires a vibrant civil society whose potential cannot be achieved in the absence of free expression. This third phase of change, building on the expansion of human rights, is being challenged by claims to change that stress charismatic actors, or centralization of power leading to restrictions on expression, and its subordination to governments.
While these three phases generally allow us to understand the focus of the InterAmerican system in different historic periods, it is important to note that these phases are not strictly separated. There are diverse elements of these phases in each of the countries in the region. 
The Inter-American Commission
Individuals may file a petition against an American state before the Commission when one or more of his or her internationally protected rights have been violated. These include rights contained in both the American Convention and the American Declaration.
29
The Convention establishes procedures to submit and process individual petitions, including admissibility, the possibility of a friendly settlement, public and private hearings, discussion on the merits, and a report.
30
Once the Commission determines a petition is admissible, it opens a case. The Commission can place itself at the disposal of the parties at all times to facilitate reaching a friendly settlement. If the parties are unable to reach a settlement that satisfies the Commission, it will consider the substance of the allegations. If the Commission finds that the state has violated a right protected by the Convention, it will adopt a report that includes measures the state must implement to correct these violations. The report adopted by the Commission is final for those states that have not ratified the American Convention or, having ratified that treaty, have not accepted the jurisdiction 27.
Grossman, supra note 22, at 188. In the case where states have ratified the American Convention but not declared their acceptance of the Court's compulsory jurisdiction, the normative value of the Commission's Final Report is grounded in the treaty. The same applies when states have accepted jurisdiction, the Commission decides not to bring a case to the Court, and the state itself, which has been found responsible for violating a human right, does not refer the case to the Court.
The Inter-American Court
The Inter-American Court is competent to hear petitions submitted by the Commission or by state parties to the American Convention that have accepted its jurisdiction. 34 The Court has both advisory and contentious 
The Office of the Special Rapporteur
The Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression ("Special Rapporteur") was created by the Commission in 1998 to protect and promote freedom of expression in the Americas. 40 The Special Rapporteur's principal activities include: 1) the preparation of general and specific thematic reports; 2) the creation of a hemispheric network for the protection of freedom of expression; 3) visits to OAS member states to observe the freedom of expression climate; and 4) the promotion of the right to freedom of expression among OAS member states. 41 Unlike other rapporteurships, the office is dedicated exclusively to the protection and promotion of freedom of expression.
42
The Office of the Special Rapporteur has contributed significantly to the protection of freedom of expression and shed further light on the interpretation of both the American Declaration and the American Convention. Its annual reports provide in-depth analysis of the overall situation of freedom of expression throughout the hemisphere, as well as the specific trends affecting the development of this right in the region. In October 2000, the Commission, interpreting the American Convention, adopted the Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression to guide the activities of the Special Rapporteur. 43 This document sets forth thirteen principles to govern freedom of expression in the Americas. 44 Because these principles were adopted unanimously by an authoritative organ of the OAS-the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights-treaty obligations have presumptively normative value. On the other hand, nothing could prevent a state from challenging its value by requesting an Advisory Opinion from the Court or challenging them in a concrete case. These principles, however, have yet to be challenged, thus strengthening the argument that their legal value has been confirmed.
39.
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Further reinforcing the importance that the Commission places on freedom of expression, its Special Rapporteur is the only Rapporteur that works on a full-time basis. 43.
Inter-American Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., 108th Reg. Sess., approved 19 Oct. 2000, available at http://www.iachr.org/declaration.htm.
44.
b. The Legal Regime
The right to freedom of expression in the Inter-American system is regulated by Articles 13 and 14 of the American Convention, 45 as well as in Article 4 46 of the American Declaration.
47 This section will focus on the protection of the right to freedom of expression under the American Convention. Its analysis is helpful, however, in understanding the overall regime protecting this right, which includes the American Declaration. Several factors have led to the emergence of a unified legal regime on the right to freedom of expression. The Convention elaborates the content of human rights obligations laid down by the American Declaration, including the right to freedom 45 .
Article 13 of the American Convention expressly states:
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought and expression. This right includes freedom to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing, in print, in the form of art, or through any other medium of one's choice.
2. The exercise of the right provided for in the foregoing paragraph shall not be subject to prior censorship but shall be subject to subsequent imposition of liability, which shall be expressly established by law to the extent necessary to ensure:
a. respect for the rights or reputations of others; or b. the protection of national security, public order, or public health or morals.
3. The right of expression may not be restricted by indirect methods or means, such as the abuse of government or private controls over newsprint, radio broadcasting frequencies, or equipment used in the dissemination of information, or by any other means tending to impede the communication and circulation of ideas and opinions.
4. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 2 above, public entertainments may be subject by law to prior censorship for the sole purpose of regulating access to them for the moral protection of childhood and adolescence; Article 14 adds:
1. Anyone injured by inaccurate or offensive statements or ideas disseminated to the public in general by a legally regulated medium of communication has the right to reply or to make a correction using the same communications outlet, under such conditions as the law may establish.
2. The correction or reply shall not in any case remit other legal liabilities that may have been incurred.
3. For the effective protection of honor and reputation, every publisher, and every newspaper, motion picture, radio, and television company, shall have a person responsible who is not protected by immunities or special privileges.
American Convention, supra note 2, arts. 13, 14. 46.
Article 4 of the American Declaration provides that "[e]very person has the right to freedom of investigation, of opinion, and of the expression and dissemination of ideas, by any medium whatsoever." American Declaration, supra note 2, art. 4. 47.
With the 11 September 2001 approval of the Inter-American Democratic Charter, the political organs of the OAS were given the possibility of suspending a government's membership in the case of mass and grave human rights violations. In particular, the Democratic Charter specifically mentions freedom of expression as a right to be protected. Inter-American Democratic Charter, adopted 11 Sept. 
The Scope of Freedom of Expression
Subsection one of Article 13 of the American Convention establishes the right of individuals to think and express themselves freely. 71 It also details what freedom of expression means-"to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers"-and emphasizes that the medium used is irrelevant, as expression can be communicated "either orally, in writing, in print, in the form of art, or through any other medium of one's choice." 72 The jurisprudence of the Commission and the Court interprets the right to freedom of expression as prohibiting prior censorship and authorizing only the subsequent imposition of liability, except in exceptional situations laid down by Article 13(4) for the "moral protection" of young people. 73 American Convention, supra note 2, art. 13(1).
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American Convention, supra note 2, art. 13(4) (providing that "[n]otwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 2 above, public entertainments may be subject by law to prior censorship for the sole purpose of regulating access to them for the moral protection of childhood and adolescence").
also established the scope of permissible restrictions of this right that may apply in emergency situations. 74 All forms of speech are protected by the right to freedom of expression, including speech that is offensive, shocking, or disturbing to the state or other groups. 75 The Inter-American system has found that freedom of expression includes the right to denounce human rights violations by public officials. 76 This highlights the connection between the Inter-American system's role in protecting speech and guaranteeing access to justice, which are both crucial to the fight against impunity.
77
The Inter-American system has also identified three different types of specially protected speech, which include: "(a) political speech and speech involving matters of public interest; (b) speech regarding public officials in the exercise of their duties and candidates for public office; and (c) speech that is an element of the identity or personal dignity of the person expressing herself."
78 All of these forms of specially protected speech demonstrate the connection existing between speech and democracy; they encourage vibrant debate. Candidates and public officials should be subject to more public and voter scrutiny because they chose to enter into the public domain. The effort to protect speech that is connected to identity is intended to protect vulnerable groups, highlighting the fact that democracy is strengthened when everyone in society is heard and counts. These categories of speech are particularly relevant in the balancing of different factors for the assessment of liability. Both the Commission and Court have repeatedly affirmed that in the Inter-American system there is a strong connection between the right to freedom of expression and democracy. Some of these characteristics may overlap with later sections. The author has deemed it advisable to keep these sections separate either because supervisory organs have done so or so as to clarify a topic.
forms of expression; (d) protection of the means required to disseminate ideas; (e) protection of reproduction of expression; (f) exclusion of direct and indirect restrictions; and (g) incompatibility of public and private monopolies in information media with the right to freedom of expression.
a. Special Dual Character
Freedom of expression possesses a special dual character in that it not only involves the right of individuals to express themselves, but also the right to receive information and ideas. 81 Thus, as the Court explains in its Advisory Opinion OC-05/85, a violation of the right to freedom of expression not only infringes on an individual right, but also on "a collective right to receive any information whatsoever and to have access to the thoughts expressed by others." 82 The Court advanced this interpretation in the case The Last Temptation of Christ, where it held that "freedom of expression is a way of exchanging ideas and information between persons; it includes the right to try and communicate one's point of view to others, but it also implies everyone's right to know opinions, reports, and news." 83 The Commission has had several opportunities to discuss this characteristic further. In the case of Martorell v. Chile, where censorship of the book Impunidad Diplomática (Diplomatic Impunity) was at issue, the Commission asserted that, "arbitrary interference that infringes this right affects not just the individual right to express information and ideas but also the right of the community as a whole to receive information and ideas of all kinds." 84 The Baruch Ivcher-Bronstein v. Peru case expands on this dual character. The case was initiated when the Peruvian government deprived the majority shareholder and director of the Peruvian television channel Frecuencia Latina-Canal 2 (Latin Frequency-Channel 2) of his Peruvian nationality. The government's action was in retaliation for the channel's broadcast of various reports of human rights violations committed by the Fujimori regime in Peru during 1990-2000. 85 Because foreigners could not own television or radio stations in Peru, the removal of Ivcher-Bronstein's Peruvian citizenship resulted in his forced withdrawal from the directorship of the channel. The new owners fired the journalists who had produced the programs and ceased the broadcast of negative news about the regime.
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While litigating this case, the Commission asserted that the social character of the right to freedom of expression was much broader than its individual aspects; it protects all those who seek out and receive information or opinions emitted by the media. 87 In this case, the Commission argued, and the Court upheld, that all of society is victimized when an individual's freedom of expression is violated. 88 The Commission expanded upon this interpretation in Oropeza v. Mexico. In that case, the Commission affirmed that freedom of expression is a universal legal concept in which individuals are able to express, transmit, receive, and disseminate thoughts.
89 Accordingly, both the Commission and the Convention have consistently reaffirmed the dual character of the right of freedom of expression.
b. Indivisibility of Expression and Dissemination of Ideas
In Advisory Opinion OC-05/85, the Court defined the scope of indivisibility of expression and dissemination, stating: "restrictions that are imposed on dissemination represent, in equal measure, a direct limitation on the right to express oneself freely."
90 Furthermore, it asserted that the importance of the legal rules applicable to the press derives from this concept. 91 Finally, it added that "[f]or the average citizen it is just as important to know the opinions of others or to have access to information generally as is the very right to impart his own opinions."
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The Court had an opportunity to expand on this issue in Palamara Iribarne v. Chile. In that case, the Chilean government had seized and destroyed all hard and electronic copies of the book Ethics and Intelligence Services and prohibited its distribution. 93 The Court held that in guaranteeing the right to freedom of expression, the state must not only protect the
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See individual expression itself, but also its dissemination "through whichever appropriate medium."
94
The Commission took an analogous approach in Martorell v. Chile, where it stated that "the decision to ban the entry, circulation, and distribution of the book 'Impunidad diplomática' in Chile violates the right to impart 'information and ideas of all kinds,'" 95 protected under the right to freedom of expression.
As these cases demonstrate, the jurisprudence of the Inter-American system has strongly upheld the indivisibility of expression and dissemination of ideas.
c. Multiplicity of Forms of Expression
The right to freedom of expression is not limited to verbal expression; all types of expression are protected, including silence. 96 The Jehovah's Witnesses v. Republic of Argentina case is an example of the broad scope of the right to freedom of expression developed by the Inter-American jurisprudence.
In 1976, the Argentine military dictatorship promulgated Decree No. 1867/76, which prohibited the public exercise of the Jehovah's Witness religion in Argentina. 97 The government alleged that this religion was based on principles contrary to the Argentine nationality and basic state institutions. 98 As a result of the decree, followers of the religion were persecuted.
99
More than 300 children were expelled from school after being accused of refusing to swear allegiance to the country or to sing the Argentine national anthem. 100 The students opted instead for silence because their religion prohibited them from engaging in such veneration of national symbols. of the Argentine government, which it considered to be responsible for the alleged violations.
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As exemplified by the Commission's resolution in the Jehovah's Witnesses case, all forms of expression, including silence, are protected under the right to freedom of expression.
d. Protection of the Means Necessary to Disseminate Ideas
Having asserted the right to disseminate opinions and ideas, both the Commission and the Court determined that the American Convention provides that freedom of thought and expression includes the right to disseminate information and ideas by any means. 103 In Advisory Opinion OC-05/85, the Court affirmed that "freedom of expression . . . cannot be separated from the right to use whatever medium is deemed appropriate to impart ideas and to have them reach as wide an audience as possible."
104 The Commission asserted in its complaint in the Baruch Ivcher-Bronstein v. Peru case, discussed above, that the American Convention consecrates the right to disseminate information and ideas in an artistic form or by any other means.
e. Protection of Reproduction of Information
The right to freedom of expression includes the right to reproduction of expression originating from others. In the Herrera-Ulloa v. Costa Rica case, the state of Costa Rica convicted the petitioner on the criminal charge of defamation based on the contents of several articles published by the newspaper La Nación. 106 These articles, which previously appeared in the Belgian press, attributed illegal acts to Costa Rica's honorary representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency in Austria.
107 Costa Rican law required that the petitioner prove the veracity of the facts reported in the European press and later reproduced in La Nación in order to avoid liability. 108 The Court found this standard to be incompatible with Article 13 of the Convention and that it "has a deterrent, chilling and inhibiting effect on all those who practice journalism . In Dudley Stokes v. Jamaica, the petitioner, Dudley Stokes, editor of several prominent Jamaican newspapers, reprinted an article published by the Associated Press about a US investigation into kickbacks allegedly given to the former Jamaican Minister of Tourism, Eric Abrahams. 110 The Associated Press withdrew the report the day after it was published, but did not send notice to the Jamaican media.
111 Three days after the story was published in Jamaica, the petitioner published a statement based on a denial issued by Abrahams.
112 However, a trial court found him guilty of libel and awarded Abrahams J$80.7 million.
113 Stokes appealed the amount of damages originally awarded and obtained a reduction to J$35 million. Subsequently, the Commission found that the petitioner never appealed the domestic finding of his guilt and, therefore, this issue was deemed "not exhausted in domestic courts" and was not considered by the Commission.
114 Despite having found the petition admissible in 2004 to address issues of proportionality of the damages, the Commission ultimately denied the petitioner's request for a hearing and found the state did not violate the petitioner's right to freedom of expression.
115 The Commission's decision raises serious procedural and substantive issues because it did not afford a hearing to the petitioner and determined that issues of proportionality should be decided by domestic legal systems without providing any guidance in that regard. Since Jamaica has not accepted the Court's compulsory jurisdiction, the decision was final. However, as discussed below, in Kimel v. Argentina the Court had the opportunity to do what the Commission failed to do: develop the notion of proportionality.
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Penalizing the reproduction of information originating from third parties, in the absence of malice or grave negligence, would seriously restrict the free flow of ideas in an increasingly complex global reality where information flows from multiple and often distant actors. The exclusion of liability for reproducing this type of information does not, however, imply excluding liability of those with whom the information originated (e.g., malicious statements of fact) or the liability of those who reproduce such information with malice or grave negligence. 
f. Exclusion of Direct and Indirect Restrictions
Subsection three of Article 13 of the American Convention prohibits restrictions on freedom of expression that are carried out by indirect means designed to impede communication. 118 The Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression has defined indirect measures as those that, although not "designed strictly speaking to restrict the freedom of expression . . . [n]onetheless, in practice . . . have an adverse impact on the free circulation of ideas."
119 Unlike direct restrictions, these are harder to detect and consequently, rarely investigated.
The Baruch Ivcher-Bronstein v. Peru case, discussed above, provides an example of an indirect restriction on freedom of expression. In this case, the government did not use traditional restrictions such as libel, contempt laws, censorship, or political persecution to silence Bronstein. Instead, the regime stripped him of his nationality to achieve this goal.
120
Since then, the Inter-American jurisprudence has expanded on the concept of indirect restrictions. In the Canese v. Paraguay case, the Commission recognized punitive measures as an indirect restriction to freedom of expression. Mr. Canese was a journalist who wrote about allegations of corruption against the powerful presidential candidate Juan Carlos Wasmosy. Canese was fired from the newspaper where he worked and criminal proceedings were brought against him. He was sentenced to four months imprisonment and not allowed to leave Paraguay. The Commission stated that "[t]he inhibiting effect of the punitive measure can generate self-censorship of a person who wishes to speak out, which produces almost the same effect as direct censorship: 'opinions do not circulate. '" 121 In that case, the Court determined that "the criminal proceeding, the consequent sentence imposed on Canese . . . and the restrictions to leave the country during almost eight years and four months constituted an indirect means of restricting his freedom of thought and expression." 122 Using that law to the fullest extent, the government limited "the open debate on topics of public interest or concern and restricted Canese's exercise of freedom of thought and expression to omit his opinions for the remainder of the electoral campaign." of speech in order for a violation to occur. 124 In this case the Court found that the government of Venezuela had not violated the victim's rights per se, but it had failed its obligation to protect them from indirect restrictions by private actors. 125 In addition, the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression has been investigating new indirect means employed to restrict this right as they emerge in the region. In its 2003 Annual Report, the Rapporteur evaluated how the unregulated use of official publicity could be transformed into a restriction. For example, the abuse of funding distribution policies to benefit those who favor the government or its agents punishes those media agencies that seek a more critical approach. The Rapporteur illustrated that although "[t]here exists no inherent right to receive government advertising revenue . . . [the state] cannot deny publicity income only to specific outlets based on discriminatory criteria." 
g. Incompatibility of Public and Private Monopolies in Information Media with the Right to Freedom of Expression
Both the Court and the Commission have confirmed that the existence of public and private monopolies impedes the dissemination of individual ideas as well as the reception of the opinions of others. As a result, the existence of monopolies in the media industry is inconsistent with freedom of expression. In Advisory Opinion OC-05/85, the Court stated that "[i]t is the mass media that make[s] the exercise of freedom of expression a reality." 127 To ensure that this medium is not restricted, the Court determined that there must be "a plurality of means of communication, the barring of all monopolies . . . and guarantees for the protection of the freedom and independence of journalists."
128
In Baruch Ivcher-Bronstein v. Peru, the Commission affirmed that the free circulation of ideas is only conceivable where there are multiple sources of information in addition to respect for the media. 129 The Commission explained that it is not enough to guarantee the right to establish mass media; it is also necessary that journalists and other professionals working in the media be able to do so with the protections that the free and independent exercise of free expression this work requires. 130 Furthermore, the Special Rapporteur has stated that "assignments of radio and television broadcast frequencies should consider democratic criteria that guarantee equal opportunities of access for all individuals." 131 In a further expansion of the right of freedom of expression, the Inter-American Court, in the case of Kimel v. Argentina, 132 stated that the "plurality of the media and the prohibition of all types of monopolies in relation thereto, whatever be the form they may adopt, is imperative." 133 The Court thereby established a positive state obligation to adopt a normative framework that would guarantee the exclusion of monopolies in information media.
Prohibition of Prior Censorship
One of the principal characteristics of the right of freedom of expression in the Inter-American system is that it only allows for prior censorship when used to regulate public entertainment in order to safeguard the morals of children and adolescents. 134 Subsection two of Article 13 of the Convention provides that freedom of expression cannot be subject to prior censorship, but "shall be subject to subsequent imposition of liability." 135 The Declaration of Principles holds that direct or indirect prior censorship restricts the 130 134. Paragraph 4 of Article 13 of the American Convention states: "Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 2 above, public entertainments may be subject by law to prior censorship for the sole purpose of regulating access to them for the moral protection of childhood and adolescence." American Convention, supra note 2, art. 13(4). The rejection of prior censorship is so strong in the Inter-American system that paragraph 5 provides only subsequent criminal punishment for war propaganda and incitements to racial and religious hatred:
Any propaganda for war and any advocacy of national, racial, or religious hatred that constitute incitements to lawless violence or to any other similar action against any person or group of persons on any grounds including those of race, color, religion, language, or national origin shall be considered as offenses punishable by law.
American Convention, supra note 2, art. 13(5). 135. Id. art. 13(2). free circulation of ideas and opinions, which violates the right to freedom of expression. 136 This prohibition responds to the danger of creating filters capable of determining what individuals can hear, see, or read. Therefore, the American Convention rejects resort to justifications such as "national security," "morality," or "good habits" that could easily be used as pretexts to eliminate or encroach upon the free expression of ideas.
137
In the Western Hemisphere, both the Court and the Commission have had the opportunity to interpret the prohibition of prior censorship including: (a) the exclusion of the defense of honor as a basis for prior censorship; and (b) identifying the scope of authorized exceptions. 245 (1979) and discussing how, in interpreting Article 10 of the European Convention, the European Court for Human Rights "concluded that 'necessary,' while not synonymous with 'indispensable,' implied 'the existence of a 'pressing social need' and that, for a restriction to be 'necessary,' it is not enough to show that it is 'useful,' 'reasonable,' or 'desirable'"). 138. American Convention, supra note 2, art. 11:
a. Exclusion of Defense of Honor as a Basis for Prior Censorship
1. Everyone has the right to have his honor respected and his dignity recognized.
2. No one may be the object of arbitrary or abusive interference with his private life, his family, his home, or his correspondence, or of unlawful attacks on his honor or reputation.
3. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks. protected in Article 13. The basis of their argument is that defense of honor should be excluded from the prior censorship prohibition.
The state of Chile, for example, set forth this argument in Martorell v. Chile. The Chilean government and judiciary maintained that in the event of a conflict between Articles 11 (right to privacy) and 13 (right to freedom of expression) of the American Convention, the former must prevail. 139 In deciding the case, the Commission rejected this theory and advanced its interpretation that the rights included in those two articles of the American Convention do not present a conflict of different principles from which one must be chosen.
140 Accordingly, the Commission quoted the European Court on Human Rights, which, in a similar case, considered that it was "faced not with a choice between conflicting principles, one of which is freedom of expression, but with a principle of freedom of expression that is subject to a number of exceptions which must be narrowly interpreted."
141
The Commission reiterated this interpretation of Article 13 in its arguments in The Last Temptation of Christ. 142 In that case, the Chilean government prohibited the distribution of the film "The Last Temptation of Christ," arguing it did so to protect the "honor and reputation of Christ." 143 The Commission, in turn, replied that the "honor of the individual should be protected without prejudicing the exercise of freedom of expression and the right to receive information." 144 In deciding the case, the Court upheld the Commission's reasoning and stated that the prohibition of the movie "The Last Temptation of Christ" constituted prior censorship in violation of Article 13 of the Convention.
145
The Special Rapporteur acknowledged this interpretation in the 1998 report. In that report, the Rapporteur noted that states must respect the right to freedom of expression when legislating the protection of honor and dignity contained in Article 11 of the Convention and applying domestic law on the subject. 146 
b. Scope of Authorized Exceptions
The American Convention authorizes the following exception to its prohibition of prior censorship: censorship of public entertainment for the exclusive purpose of regulating access to such events to protect the morals of children and adolescents. 147 This exception, however, is only permitted within the framework of the Inter-American system if it conforms to the requirements of legality, necessity, reality or imminence, or valid purpose.
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In order to conform to the legality requirement, the exception must be authorized by law. Accordingly, decrees or other administrative measures would be insufficient. The requirement of necessity implies a case-by-case evaluation of the pertinence of the measure, taking into account the peculiarities of each situation, and considering the lack of other less restrictive means available to achieve the same valid purposes in order to exclude improperly-motivated prohibitions. The reality or imminence requirement refers to measures that are adopted in light of actually existing conditions or those that are certain to occur, not mere hypothetical situations that may affect the morals of children or adolescents (in public entertainments). The valid purpose exception corresponds to cases involving children where protection of morals is at issue. As of 2010, neither the Commission nor the Court has had the opportunity to further interpret this provision.
Subsequent Liability
The Inter-American system's prohibition on prior censorship does not exclude subsequent imposition of liability. But when subsequent liability is disproportionate, it effectively "gags" individuals who are faced with the threat of serious "retaliation" for expressing their opinions, producing a chilling effect for society at large. The American Convention sets forth specific requirements to establish the validity of subsequent liability. These requirements have been reflected in the jurisprudence of the Court. One of the latest cases in which the Court addressed subsequent liability is Kimel v. Argentina. 149 Kimel is an investigative historian who published a book entitled La Masacre de San Patricio in 1989. 150 The book analyzed the killings of five clergymen of the Palotine Order that occurred 4 July 1976 during the military dictatorship in Argentina. 151 Kimel examined the judicial investigation into the massacre and referred to a judicial decision adopted on 7 October 1977. 152 He raised questions concerning the behavior of the federal judge in charge of this case, alleging that the judge had complied with formal requirements, but because of pressure from the military regime had not investigated the truth. 153 The judge brought a criminal action against Kimel for defamation 147. American Convention, supra note 2, art. 13(4 or alternatively "false imputation of a publicly actionable crime," both of which are punishable by up to three years in prison according to Argentine Criminal Code. 154 Kimel was found guilty of the latter and sentenced on 25 September 1995 to one year in prison and payment of 20,000 pesos. 155 The Court found that the sentence violated the right to freedom of thought and expression laid down by the American Convention. 156 On the basis of Kimel, and other court decisions discussed below, the following requirements for subsequent liability can be identified: 1) legality; 2) democratic legitimacy; 3) necessity; 4) proportionality; 5) value judgments; 6) differentiation between opinions based on facts and value judgments; 7) preclusion of liability for reproduction of information; and 8) strict regulation of contempt laws. These requirements protect the right to freedom of expression in general, including, "those that offend, shock or disturb the majority." 157 Moreover, in the application of these requirements in a given case, special consideration must be given to protected speech including, "(a) political speech and speech involving matters of public interest; (b) speech regarding public officials in the exercise of their duties and candidates for public office; and (c) speech that is an element of the identity or personal dignity of the person expressing herself."
158 This type of speech is essential for democracy, and accordingly must be subject to rigorous scrutiny.
a. Legality
Article 13 of the American Convention provides that the subsequent imposition of liability should be expressly established by law.
159 This is confirmed in Article 30, 160 162 Different consequences often arise from this concept of legality. First, subsequent liability can be imposed only by statute and not by an act of the executive. Second, a statute has less normative value than a constitution and hence cannot narrow a constitutional norm. Third, there is a prohibition on the retroactive application of restrictions, based on the notion that no one can be responsible for conduct that, when undertaken, was not illegal.
In Kimel v. Argentina, the Court had an opportunity to refer to subsequent liability. The Court emphasized that the law must be clearly established, and must provide clear guidance to individuals as to what constitutes permissible conduct. 163 Again, in the case Usón-Ramírez v. Venezuela, decided in November 2009, the Court found that the Venezuelan law under which a former General in the Venezuelan army was convicted of "slander against the National Armed Forces" was far too vague to meet the legality threshold of Article 13. 164 Usón-Ramírez was sentenced to five years and six months in prison for speaking on television about alleged criminal conduct that took place at a military prison and "dishonoring the Venezuelan military." 165 The Court ruled that the statute was too ambiguous to meet the legality requirement because it did not clearly establish the elements of the crime, nor did it specify the mens rea needed for conviction. 166 
b. Democratic Legitimacy
The principle of legality is inextricably linked to that of legitimacy. Article 13 requires that in order to be valid, the imposition of liability must also be legitimate. 167 In Advisory Opinion-05/85, the Court affirmed that this principle should be understood as one requiring public authorities to conduct themselves in strict conformity with the requirements set forth in both the constitutional and Inter-American systems. 168 In the Americas, legitimacy requires the effective exercise of a representative democracy, including inter alia, respect for divergent views. 169 
c. Necessity
The need for subsequent liability will depend on its origin and purpose, namely, whether it is oriented toward satisfying a compelling public interest within the framework of a representative democracy. Among the means that may be employed to meet this objective, the least restrictive should be chosen. 170 Finally, whether "public order," "public morals," "national security," "public health," or some other concept is invoked to establish subsequent liability, such expressions should be subject to an interpretation strictly tied to the just demands of a democratic society which, of course, include freedom of expression.
Although the American Convention does not explicitly state the "necessity" requirement, the Court established that this requirement applies to every article in the American Convention pursuant to Article 29. 171 The latter states that all articles of the Convention must be interpreted as protecting representative democracy. 172 The Court, in its jurisprudence, acknowledged the difference in terminology between the American Convention and Article 10 of the European Convention, which uses the expression "necessary in a democratic society." 173 The Court found that this difference is irrelevant since the European Convention does not contain any provision comparable with Article 29 of the American Convention.
Unfortunately, the Court in Kimel and Usón-Ramírez did not rule that criminal sanctions for speech violated the American Convention. 174 However, in Kimel, the Court declared that criminal sanctions should be reserved for extremely serious conduct, and be based upon information that "shows the absolute necessity to resort to criminal proceedings. also the government itself, reiterating that it did not rule criminal liability out completely, but created a high threshold for imposing criminal liability to protect the government's right to honor. 176 In Tristán-Donoso v. Panama the Court noted that factors such as the extreme seriousness of the conduct, actual malice, and unfair damage caused can be used to evaluate the necessity of criminal proceedings. 177 After evaluating those factors, the Court found that the criminal punishment imposed on Tristán-Donoso was unnecessary.
178 Therefore, while criminal liability has not been excluded, the Court has developed strict requirements to evaluate whether there is "absolute necessity" to resort to criminal law. Thus far, the Court has not found absolute necessity in any case.
d. Proportionality
Subsequent liability should be in proportion to the end sought, whether the end is to assure respect for individual rights, the reputation of third parties, or the protection of "national security," "public order," "public health," or "morals." This requirement has great importance, since excessive fines, detention, and imprisonment can have the same chilling effect as prior censorship.
In Kimel v. Argentina, the Court carefully balanced under a "strict proportionality" standard Kimel's right to express his opinion against the right of the judge to have his honor respected, considering that both rights are protected in the American Convention. 179 The Court found that the violation of Kimel's right to freedom of expression outweighed the alleged impairment of the right to have one's honor respected. 180 The harsh criminal sanction in Usón-Ramírez was disproportionate to the goal of protecting the military's honor, according to the Court, and proportionality should guide the behavior of the state when exercising its punitive power. or (ii) serious negligence. 182 In its report on contempt, the Commission addressed the issue and established the "actual malice" standard as the only one compatible with the Convention. 183 In its analysis, the Commission found that the exceptio veritatis, or the need for the defendant to prove the truthfulness of his statements, is abusive. 184 It argued that asking such proof from the defendant shifts the burden of proof from the plaintiff to the defendant against well-established legal principles. Moreover, in criminal cases, it affects the defendant's presumption of innocence until guilt is proven. 185 In Kimel, while the court did not exclude the possibility of criminal sanctions, it stated explicitly that this possibility requires satisfaction of several factors, including "actual malice."
186 In Tristán-Donoso v. Panama the Court confirmed this approach.
187 Tristán-Donoso stated that Attorney General of Panama intercepted his phone calls without any legal authorization. A court in Panama however, determined that this was false and imposed a criminal punishment and duty to compensate on Tristán-Donoso. The Court determined that this was disproportionate, because when Tristán-Donoso made this statement it was a reasonable determination without malice or grave negligence.
f. Differentiation Between Opinions of Fact and Value Judgments
Value judgments do not create liability because they do not assert facts. They are simply subjective opinions that individuals can freely determine to be valid or invalid. This type of expression is protected in broad terms by Article 13, which asserts that freedom of expression involves "the freedom to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas of all kinds."
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In the Inter-American system, there is an explicit right not only to "receive" information, but also to "disseminate" opinions. 190 If subsequent imposition of liability were permitted in the case of the dissemination of The opinions expressed by Mr. Kimel can neither be deemed to be true nor false. As such, an opinion cannot be subjected to sanctions, even more so where it is a value judgment on the actions of a public official in the performance of his duties. In principle, truthfulness or falseness may only be established in respect of facts. Hence, the evidence regarding value judgments may not be examined according to truthfulness requirements. 191 In the case of Usón-Ramírez, the Court emphasized that it is in the best interest of the public that the government be freely subject to public scrutiny. 192 The Court emphasized that opinions and reports about the government should be allowed into the public discourse with great leeway to foster a "truly democratic society." 
g. Strict Regulation of Contempt Laws with the American Convention
Contempt laws provide punishment for offensive expressions directed at public officials in the fulfillment of their duties and are currently in force in at least nine OAS member states. 194 The Commission has repeatedly asserted, through its case law as well as in its Report on the Compatibility of "Desacato" [Contempt] Laws with the American Convention on Human Rights ("Report on Contempt Laws"), that such laws are incompatible with freedom of expression.
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The Commission's report followed the friendly settlement in the Horacio Verbitsky v. Republic of Argentina case that resulted in the elimination of Argentina's contempt law. 196 In that case, an Argentine journalist was sentenced to one month in prison after being found guilty of contempt when he referred to an Argentine Supreme Court justice as "disgusting" in a national newspaper, Página 12. 197 The Commission found that contempt laws, when applied, directly affect the type of open debate guaranteed by Article 13 that is essential to the existence of a democratic society. 198 The Special Rapporteur expanded on the issue and stated that "contempt laws seek to avoid debate as well as the scrutiny or criticism of state officials," and that these laws, "instead of protecting freedom of expression or civil servants limit freedom of expression and weaken the democratic system."
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The Court further clarified the issue in Canese v. Paraguay, finding that a different threshold of protection of reputations should be applied to public officials, individuals who exercise functions of a public nature, and politicians. 200 This threshold is not based on the nature of the subject, but rather on the characteristic of public interest inherent in the activities or acts of a specific individual. 201 Furthermore, in Herrera-Ulloa v. Costa Rica, the Court observed that those individuals who have an influence on matters of public interest have laid themselves open voluntarily to a more intense public scrutiny and, consequently, in this domain, they are subject to a higher risk of being criticized. Their activities go beyond the private sphere and fall within the realm of public debate.
202
The Court in Kimel acknowledged that while protection of a person's honor and reputation are legitimate ends, "public officials should be more the Spanish word used in Verbitsky's article was "asqueroso" and explains that the term can mean either disgusting or disgusted. 
The Right to Access Information
The right to access information is fundamental to the ongoing development of democracy. It is found in subsection one of Article 13 of the American Convention, which provides that the right to freedom of expression includes the freedom to seek out and receive information of all kinds. 207 With respect to this issue, the Court has noted that "a society that is not well informed is not a society that is truly free." 208 Restrictions on access to information held by public or private institutions (e.g., credit institutions) must be "judged by reference to the legitimate needs of democratic societies and institutions." 209 This implies that the existence of an absolute prohibition on access to information is incompatible with the American Convention. Although exceptions and limited restrictions are possible (e.g., for national security reasons), they should be narrowly interpreted and subject to judicial review in all cases.
The Inter-American Court was the first international tribunal to recognize the right to freedom of information as part of the right to freedom of expression in the case of Claude Reyes v. Chile. In that case, Reyes requested information from the Chilean Foreign Investment Committee regarding a deforestation project that he alleged could be detrimental to the environment and sustainable development of Chile. 210 The Chilean government failed to provide some of the requested information and did not give a reason for withholding it. 211 The Court held that the Chilean government's failure to provide part of the requested information constituted a violation of "the right to freedom of thought and expression embodied in Article 13 of the American Convention to the detriment [of the petitioner], and failed to comply with the general obligation to respect and ensure the rights and freedoms established in Article 1(1) thereof." 212 In 2005, Chile reformed its Constitution in an effort to adapt its laws to the American Convention. The Constitution now establishes "that the confidentiality or secrecy of information must be established by law, [which is] a provision that did not exist at the time of the facts of this case." 213 Prior to the Court's decision, several other non-jurisdictional bodies had built on the right to freedom of information. The Commission began developing this right as a "means of guaranteeing the right to protection against information that is abusive, inaccurate, or prejudicial to individuals." 214 In continuing with this process, the Commission also established a right to "access to public and private databases for the purpose, as necessary, of updating, correcting, removing, or reserving information about the individual concerned. This action, known as habeas data, was introduced as a modality of the 'amparo' process for the protection of personal privacy." . In addition, the action of habeas data imposes certain obligations for entities that process information: the obligation to use the data for specific, explicitly stated objectives, and the obligation to guarantee the security of the data against accidental, unauthorized access or manipulation. In cases where entities of the state or the private sector obtain data improperly and/or illegally, the petitioner must have access to that information, even when classified, so that individuals have control over data that affects them. The action of habeas data as a mechanism for ensuring the accountability of security and intelligence agencies within this context provides a means to verify that personal data has been gathered legally. The action of habeas data entitles the injured party, or his family members, to ascertain the purpose for which the data was collected and, if collected illegally, to determine whether the responsible parties are punishable. Public disclosure of illegal practices in the collection of personal data can have the effect of preventing such practices by these agencies in the future. The Commission developed the principle of full disclosure on the rule regarding access to information, which creates a legal presumption in favor of publicizing state-held information and imposes three conditions on restrictions to the principle: legality, proportionality, and legitimacy. It also asserted a need for judicial recourse for the review of a rejection to an information request. 217 In analyzing another aspect of the right to information, the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression held in its 2003 Annual Report that "[t]he right of access to information is also a component of the right to know the truth." 218 The Report further noted:
[T]he right to know the truth is a collective right that ensures society access to information that is essential for the workings of democratic systems[. I]t is also a private right for relatives of the [human rights] victims, which affords a form of compensation, in particular, in cases where amnesty laws are adopted. . . . Access to state-held information is similarly necessary to prevent future abuses by government officials and also to ensure that effective remedies against such abuses are guaranteed. 
Right of Correction and Reply
Having established freedom of expression and thought in Article 13, the American Convention provides for a right of correction and reply in Article 14. 220 In Advisory Opinion OC-07/86, the Court asserted that these articles are inescapably related: "in regulating the application of the right of reply or correction, the states parties must respect the right of freedom of expression guaranteed by Article 13. They may not, however, interpret the right of freedom of expression so broadly as to negate the right of reply proclaimed by Article 14(1)." 221 The Court added that the right to reply guarantees respect for freedom of expression in both its individual and shared dimensions. In the individual dimension, the Court recognizes that this right "guarantees that a party injured by inaccurate or offensive statements has the opportunity to express his [or her] views and thoughts about the injurious statements." 222 The Court further recognized that in the social dimension this right gives every person "the benefit of new information that contradicts or disagrees with the previous inaccurate or offensive statements." 223 In this respect, the right acts as a balance of information which is needed for the public to form a true and correct opinion. 224 While the Court has not had the opportunity to apply the law of correction to a contentious case, its Advisory Opinion OC-07/86 confirms certain elements of this right. 225 First, the right of correction cannot legitimately include value judgments. Second, since there are many ways of expressing opinions, the correction or reply may not always be accomplished through the same means (e.g., location, size, format).
Emergency Situations and Their Impact on Freedom of Expression
The regulation of emergency situations is of great importance to the protection of rights in general and to the protection of freedom of expression in particular. Emergency situations arise when there is a threat against the life of the nation. These situations permit restrictions on human rights, including the right to freedom of expression.
In the Western Hemisphere, the emergency exception has been regularly abused. Imaginary threats and real emergencies have become the arguments of choice for justifying abuses and often mass and gross violations of human rights. 226 Attempting to curb those abuses, the American Convention regulates emergencies extensively. Article 27 of this Convention sets forth the conditions required to validly declare an emergency, lists non-derogable rights, and the requirements that must be met to suspend other rights. The conditions are strict (a real or imminent threat to the life of a nation) and must satisfy very high standards, namely that the state must show that the normal powerful means at its disposal are insufficient to address events that affect the continuation of civilized life. 228 The requirements prescribed by the American Convention for the timely suspension of rights-including freedom of expression-are: 1) necessity (there must be absolutely no other possible alternatives in the case at hand); 2) timeliness (the suspension of rights is valid strictly for the time required); 3) proportionality (measures adopted cannot be an excessive reaction on the part of the authorities in light of the existing emergency); 4) compatibility (with other duties imposed by international law); 5) non-discrimination; and 6) compliance with the law by the authorities (since the temporary suspension of rights supposes actions by authorities consistent with the law declared for reasons of general interest and for the purpose for which they were established). 229 
The Link Between Freedom of Expression and Democracy
Both the Court and the Commission have established that there is an inherent link between freedom of expression and democracy. 230 As stated early on in this article, in Advisory Opinion OC-05/85, the Court affirmed that "[f]reedom of expression is a cornerstone upon which the very existence of a democratic society rests," 231 and that this freedom is essential for the development of political parties, trade unions, scientific and cultural societies, and those who wish to influence the public.
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The Commission explained its position with respect to this point in its complaint before the Court in the Baruch Ivcher-Bronstein v. Peru case. It asserted that Article 13 reflects a broad interpretation of freedom of expression and personal autonomy, the object of which is to protect and strengthen access to information, ideas, and expressions of all types, in order to fortify the democratic process. 233 Respect for these freedoms is not limited to al-lowing the circulation of "acceptable" opinions and ideas. 234 Furthermore, in Canese v. Paraguay, the Commission stated:
The right to freedom of expression is precisely the right of the individual and of the whole community to take part in active, concrete, and challenging debates on all aspects of the normal, harmonious functioning of the society. These debates can often be critical of and even offensive to those who exercise public positions or who are involved in formulating public policy. 235 As stated by the Special Rapporteur, when debate is restricted, the development of democracy is interrupted because the free debate of ideas and opinion among citizens is impeded. 236 The link between freedom of expression and democracy has been part of a development process within the context of the OAS. Currently, only democratic states may become members of that Organization. An important milestone in this process was reached when OAS Resolution 1080 was adopted in Santiago, Chile in 1991. 237 It allows OAS political organs to take active measures, including diplomatic initiatives, when the constitutional process of a country breaks down. 238 The Inter-American Democratic Charter broadens the scope of situations that would warrant OAS actions. 239 The Charter specifically mentions respect for freedom of expression. It was built on the jurisprudence cited above and determined that democracy provides the theoretical and practical ground to guarantee freedom of information, as a necessary structure to secure compliance with human rights.
240
III. CoNCLUSIoN
The interpretations of the American Convention by the Court and the Commission have developed a normative framework designed to protect freedom of expression in the Inter-American system. Achieving full protection of the right to freedom of expression in the Americas requires that states fully comply with existing regional norms, as well as incorporating them into domestic law. To meet these obligations, the following measures are essential.
First, contempt laws should be abolished, and moreover, defamation should result only in civil liability. Although the Inter-American Court has kept a residual possibility for criminal sanctions, the imposition of such sanctions is subject to a stringent test; and in no case brought to its attention has the Court found that the test has been satisfied. 241 The free interchange of ideas is essential for democratic society, and the possibility of criminal sanctions in matters of public interest has a chilling effect. Furthermore, defending the honor of individuals who act in the public domain through civil sanctions only is preferable, due to the stifling effect that the criminalization of speech has on debate. Because of the tenuous line that exists between private and public matters, there are also advantages to decriminalizing speech in all Alexander Meiklejohn argued that free speech is essential for self-government. This theory held that people should be free to express their opinions without any fear of a restriction on their speech and that nations should reject libel actions so that all mediums may criticize the government and government officials. 191, 221 (1954) . In Sullivan, the US Supreme Court held that a public official could not bring a libel action against critics of his or her official conduct. According to the Court, "whatever is added to the field of libel is taken from the field of free debate." The Verbitsky case is an example of the government's use of a contempt law to deter public debate of government officials in the Inter-American system. This case, ultimately resolved in friendly settlements, led to Argentina's revocation of its libel laws and a reversal of Verbitsky's contempt charge.
In 1977, Vincent Blasi expounded his theory that "free speech, a free press, and free assembly" can serve in checking the abuse of power by public officials. The InterAmerican Court,held that access to public information permits the public to "question, investigate, and consider whether public functions are being performed adequately. slander and libel laws. Again, the honor of individuals could be defended through civil liability. While no jurisprudence has been developed by the Inter-American Court in this matter, the language of Article 13 requires proportionate sanctions and provides a basis for an interpretation that excludes the application of criminal law.
In the concurring opinion of Kimel, Judge Sergio García-Ramírez elaborated on his earlier opinion in Herrera-Ulloa and advocated a complete departure from criminal sanctions to civil proceedings. 242 He regards the steps taken by the majority in the Kimel judgment to limit criminal sanctions as insufficient and urged that the same results can be achieved through the civil courts without the disadvantages that criminal court proceedings carry. 243 Second, subsequent civil liability should also be strictly regulated because it chills freedom of expression. The Court's reasoning in the Kimel case has provided a framework for analysis that must be strictly applied. 244 As outlined in the "Subsequent Liability" section above, Article 13(2) of the American Convention expressly requires that the restrictions and scope of liability for abuse be determined by law. Broad interpretations of permissible grounds for subsequent liability or disproportionate civil responsibilities negatively impact the free expression of ideas and could have the same impact of prior censorship.
Third, defense of honor should be limited to natural persons and not extended to institutions. Accordingly, it should exclude situations where expression of an opinion is charged as "slander against the National Armed Forces," as in Usón-Ramírez. 245 Legitimate national security concerns in the framework of a democratic society could be taken into account for the purposes of subsequent of liability, but there is no place in the Convention to resort to honor concepts designed to protect individuals. 246 Fourth, freedom of expression requires pluralism in the media and rejection of public and private monopolies. To achieve this objective, antimonopolistic laws should be developed and strictly enforced. Moreover, the Court has found that states have a positive obligation to "not only minimize restrictions on the dissemination of information, but also extend equity rules, to the greatest possible extent, to the participation in the public debate of different types of information, fostering informative pluralism." 247 It is im-portant to give guidance to states, the media, and the public in general as to the content of the Court's interpretation. The Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression could play a crucial role in this process. It is within her mandate to present studies and reports to the states or the Commission that contribute to the full realization of freedom of expression. These studies can become, if adopted by the Commission, valid interpretations of the American Convention.
In the conditions of the hemisphere, where authoritarianism is a recent occurrence and we are witnessing new attempts at centralization of power, the importance of a normative framework that secures pluralistic expression cannot be exaggerated. The need to secure pluralistic expression should focus on the addition of voices and not on the suppression of expression, a danger that unfortunately is currently present. The importance of this matter would require the identification of legitimate criteria to ensure pluralistic expression by an authoritative organ like the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.
Fifth, transparency should be encouraged in the functions of both the government and private organizations. The adoption of domestic laws that guarantee free access to information in the possession of government and private organizations is fundamental to achieving the full protection of freedom of expression.
Finally, the role of the Inter-American system continues to be crucial, providing a venue to promote and protect the right of freedom of expression when a state is unable or unwilling to apply its international obligation. That role, however, needs to be expanded further.
The Office of the Special Rapporteur needs to be strengthened to ensure it receives sufficient resources to function properly. The Office of the Rapporteur is currently mostly grant-funded, which makes long-term planning a challenge. In addition, the Special Rapporteur should be able to perform unannounced visits in loco to states-particularly in situations where the lives of journalists are at stake.
Human rights training on the right to freedom of expression for civil servants, judges, lawyers, and journalists is required to invoke and apply international norms in the domestic realm. This training could play a preventative role to the extent that violations of the right of freedom of expression are the result of lack of knowledge of its content.
The Inter-American system should strengthen its petition system on the right to freedom of expression. This may be accomplished by ensuring hearings and prompt decisions of the cases concerning this right, including provisional measures if irreparable harm is present. The system must also denounce lack of compliance with the decisions of supervisory organs by states that have violated the American Convention. At a minimum, the political organs should place on the agenda decisions by the supervisory organs including violations of the right to freedom of expression. Specific discussion of human rights violations mobilize public opinion and have a potential for negative internal political repercussions for a government. Public discussion also creates space for the adoption of regional measures to protect and promote this freedom, e.g., suspension from participation in the organization when this right has been violated, in accordance with the Democratic Charter. 248 The impact of public discussion of violations and the political willingness to act in each case are debatable issues. However, victims perceive the total absence of debate and action by the political organs of the OAS concerning human rights offenses as the worst alternative. Governments that violate human rights do what they can to silence the victims. A debate preceded by the decision of an authoritative organ may not secure remedial action or punishment of the wrongdoer. It may, however, carry the possibility of influencing national and international actors in the long process of achieving human dignity.
